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Small Investors! Change the Game!

Wednesday, February 17, 2010

We are admirers of Eric Jackson of Ironfire Capital, who recently led a small investors revolt at Yahoo that contributed to an overdue management shakeup there.

He was recently quoted in a piece in the Wall Street Journal, in a piece that recommends five actions that small investors can take to restore fairness to the way in which shareholders are treated. It's well worth reading.

Sources for the Video: Who is Watching Over Your Money?

Friday, January 8, 2010

26% of wealth: The Wealth of Older Americans and the Sub-prime Debacle, Barry Bosworth and Rosanna Smart, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and Brookings Institution

Most CEOs chair board: Spencer Stuart Board Index 2009, p. 20.

Board selection: Ownership and Control, Margaret Blair, p. 79.

Almost impossible: Ownership and Control, Blair, p. 79.

Ignore votes: "Commentary: How Shareholder Votes Are Legally Rigged," Louise Lavelle, BusinessWeek, May 20, 2002. This is a succinct statement of the problem. Since it was written, there have been no large-scale or substantive changes.

Set pay packages: The Complete Guide to Executive Compensation, Bruce Eilig, p. 579.

CEO Salary: Politifact.com. This figure was frequently misinterpreted by politicians and the media. Politifact sorted through the charges and got to the base data.

10% of all net profits: Harvard Professor Lucian Bebchuk and Cornell Prof. Yaniv Grinstein. 2005. The Growth of Executive Pay, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21(2): 283-303.

Female directors: Spencer Stuart Board Index 2009, p. 9

85%: Spencer Stuart Board Index 2009, p. 9

2.5 days a month: National Association of Corporate Directors, 2009 Annual Survey.

$212,750: Spencer Stuart Board Index 2009, p. 33. We strongly believe that some directors should be paid more than this average. In our book we recommend the creation of a new set of full-time, specially trained directors who would upgrade the performance of the two to three boards each joins.

Shareholder wealth losses: Losses are calculated from the market capitalization high prior to recent drop to the final level at sale, government takeover or bailout, bankruptcy, or CEO resignation.

$7 trillion: The Stock Slump of 2008: Wrecking Ball to Wealth," Washington Post, January 11, 2009.

Credits:

Direction, cinematography and editing: Jay Gillespie - forjaygillespie@gmail.com; Writing: John Gillespie and David Zweig; Lighting tech: Ted King; Chairman: John Gillespie; Slot machines: Bob Levy www.antiqueslotmachines.comCigar: Montecristo #1.

One cigar (but no money) was destroyed in the production of this video.

Excess Pay = Excess Investor Trouble

Wednesday, December 30, 2009

Three professors have just released a study that finds that firms whose boards overpay executives also create abnormally low returns for investors "for periods up to five years after sorting on pay. For example, firms that pay their CEOs in the top ten percent of pay earn negative abnormal returns over the next five years of approximately -13%. The effect is stronger for CEOs who receive higher incentive pay relative to their peers." The results "are consistent with high-pay induced CEO overconfidence and investor overreaction towards firms with high paid CEOs."

For every dollar overpaid to a CEO, they found, investors lose $100. Indeed, "firms in the highest compensation decile earn significant negative excess returns. The performance worsens significantly over time. We find that the worst component of incentive pay for future performance is the value of options granted and long-term incentive payouts to executives. The proportions of these two components in total compensation are significantly negatively related to the excess return earned by the firm."

After Congress imposed heavier taxes on high cash payouts, CEOs and boards moved to stock options as a way to align the interests of executives with those of shareholders. While some of the results surely proved beneficial, some CEOs also got into the game of "managing earnings"through accounting tricks, or pursuing short-term strategies to boost earnings.

How CEO Pay Rises

Monday, December 28, 2009

Directorship magazine carried an article about the process by which compensation firms calculate, and boards approve (and perennially increase) CEO pay. It speaks to the value of disclosure and the hollowness of regulation. It raises the question, "Now that you know, what do you do?"

Recently the SEC required compensation consultants to release the comparable companies they pour into their sausage grinders to extrude an acceptable pay plan. They use a median of 19 firms to calculate the winning number. "According to the [an Equilar] study," Directorship notes, most companies benchmark to peers one-half to two times their size. Stand on the shoulders of giants, and all that.

Now, if you believe there's a correlation between company size and executive pay, you're really on to something.

Now that we know how the game is played (thank you, disclosure regulations), what will be done about it?

  1. Government can regulate pay: This is a losing idea now driving all manners of extraordinary behavior as our federal pay czar attempts to bring the surviving, but wounded stragglers of our financial sector, to heel. It's great PR and lousy policy.
  2. Shareholders can vote against the excess: Since the majority of votes are cast not by individual shareholders but by the institutional intermediaries who hold their stocks (think mutual funds and pension plans, to name but two), one hand of the investment body would have to slap another. This doesn't always happen.
  3. Boards could do the right thing: This would be ideal. But as long as the culture of many boards demands obeisance to CEO who "brung 'em to the party," it's not likely to change. Either boards change the power relationship themselves, or shareholders put people on the board willing and able to do so. The SEC is considering measures that facilitate that process.

SEC Passes New Regulations to Curb Abuses

Wednesday, December 16, 2009

The Securities Exchange Commission passed disclosure requirements in seven areas, effective February 28, 2010, to address some of the abuses that led us into the financial abyss sixteen months ago. For the most part, they are designed to remove a bit of the opacity that obscures the operations of boards.

For example, typically boards produce precisely the number of nominees required to match the number of vacant seats in an election. They provide the individual resumés, but in some cases they pack the board with cronies devoid of real qualifications. The new rules might serve as some sort of "sniff test" that would embarrass such a nominee, or at least provoke some highly creative resumé writing.

AIG collapsed, many believe, because the insurer created huge perverse incentives to take risk, under the mistaken assumption that the downside could be externalized. Alas, only the Bureau of Engraving can print money in the real world, as AIG (and the rest of us) learned to our common dismay. Now, companies must disclose such vulnerabilities. It remains to be seen whether this will truly alter pay practices within the financial sector, for example.

Last year, the House held hearings on conflicts of interest and alleged misfeasance among some of the consultants who provide advice or cover for boards that must produce compensation packages for top executives. For many firms, fees for this type of sensitive work are small in relation to much larger HR consulting and transactional tasks. Yet, for consultants, "good performance" in meeting the magic number is probably instrumental in landing the bigger jobs. The new regs will shine more sunlight on this relationship.

Predictably, the regulations have kicked up opposition in many corporate circles. Critics complain they'll generate yet more busywork, while not doing much to forestall the next crisis. Whatever the merits of this argument, a reading of the disclosure objectives (below ) suggests that conscientious boards would have done all this on their own, to preclude the intrusion of the SEC.
  • The relationship of a company's compensation policies and practices to risk management.
  • The background and qualifications of directors and nominees.
  • Legal actions involving a company's executive officers, directors and nominees.
  • The consideration of diversity in the process by which candidates for director are considered for nomination.
  • Board leadership structure and the board's role in risk oversight.
  • Stock and option awards to company executives and directors.
  • Potential conflicts of interests of compensation consultants.

Intel's Virtual Board Meeting - Progress or High Tech Evasion?

Sunday, November 29, 2009

Shareholders have their say at annual meetings. When the numbers look good, executives puff their chests and tell us how their hard work has paid off for "our company." When the results are bad, the "our company" talk gets shelved, and seething stockholders may be allowed to vent, perhaps even to insult the CEO. Thereafter a security team typically escorts the executives to one or more private jets underwritten by these same owners. Owners will get to speak anger to power the following year, for perhaps three minutes apiece. In bad or good times, there must be a better way.

In either case, annual meetings are empty rituals that invite comparisons to kabuki theater or Iranian show trials. They meet a legal requirement, and generally accomplish little. Now, Intel has mitigated the suffering for all parties by moving its annual meeting entirely online. Delaware courts enabled such meetings almost a decade ago, but until now, major corporations have not exercised this right. We're not clear whether Intel sees this action as the latest extension of a radically cool technology fetish, or it's simply a way to avoid the Great Unwashed, but our friend Glyn Holton at isuffrage.org thinks virtual annual meetings rank far worse than a floating decimal error.

There is every reason to believe that, with strong safeguards, virtual shareholder meetings could enhance shareholder participation in meetings while protecting—even restoring—shareholder rights that have atrophied over the decades. However, no such safeguards are in place. Intel and other smaller corporations are taking a go-it-alone approach, forcing virtual shareholder meetings on unhappy shareholders. After Delaware changed its laws [Editor's note: to allow virtual meetings to replace flesh and blood meetings, at the sole discretion of management and the board], the Council of Institutional Investors wrote the CEOs of all Delaware corporations asking them not to conduct virtual meetings. Unions have expressed concerns. Walden Asset Management has encouraged shareholders to write letters to Intel.

Proponents believe virtual meetings will enhance shareholder participation by enabling more people to participate, and at no expense. Unimpressed, Glyn Holton describes a few nightmare scenarios — opportunistic technical snafus that cut off shareholders, pre-recorded speeches by executives, and software that doesn't enable activities one could pursue in a real meeting, to name but three. And then there's the isolation of individual shareholders at their screen-cells. If someone boos at his computer and no one hears it, did it really happen? This can be the ultimate divide-and-conquer.

Broadridge, the monopolist that controls the shareholder vote-counting trade, is now selling virtual shareholder meeting services, and Intel is using their new VSM (Virtual Shareholder Meeting) product. Intel may be the first drop of a coming torrent of virtual meetings.

Intel has done some fine things in governance in the past, and has recently adopted "say on pay" to enable shareholders to cast non-binding votes on executive pay programs. Giving Intel the benefit of the doubt, we do believe there exist certain types of human engagement for which Internet technology offers a great leap backward. After the May 2010 webcast, we hope that Intel has a solid method for determining whether the owners' interests truly are being served.

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